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Abstract 
Drawing on the fast and frugal research programme, this paper describes a retrospective 
field study of decision making during water contamination events. It characterises three 
heuristics employed in real-world decision making. The credibility heuristic discriminates 
between signals from targets and noise from distracters on the basis of the perceived 
trustworthiness of the message conveyor. With the precedent heuristic, the response to an 
unfolding event is determined by searching for past analogues (i.e. precedents) and, if 
found, treating the current event in the same fashion. By contrast, the facts-trump-
speculation heuristic discriminates between conflicting explanations or claims according 
to how they rank on pre-determined hierarchies of evidence (orders of cue validities), 
neglecting utilities and avoiding the aggregation of competing lines of evidence. Rather 
than cataloguing the biases that these heuristics lead to, this paper focuses on the 
structural factors which shape each heuristic's ecological rationality. In doing so, the 
study develops ideas about how particular infrastructure systems and forms of social 
organisation structure the validity of cues, the accessibility of information, and the 
application of particular heuristics. The study also introduces the concept of safeguards to 
rule-based reasoning, and the idea that heuristics can be used to rationalize decisions, and 
deployed strategically to persuade other social actors. The over-arching claim is that the 
fast and frugal programme provides a powerful framework for analysing judgment and 
choice in organisations, and offers a bridge between psychological and political models 
of organisational behaviour. 
Keywords: heuristics; organizational crises; disasters; organizational decision 
making.
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Fast and frugal crisis management: an analysis of rule-based judgment 
and choice during water contamination events 
 
INTRODUCTION: PARADIGMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 
Along with its central role in economics, political theory, and sociology, rational 
choice theory lay at the heart of much early scholarship on organisational decision 
making (Renn, 2008, p 26; Simon, 1979). That is, business decisions were broadly 
conceived of as being structured, evaluated and resolved in accordance with the norms of 
utility maximisation, probability theory, and the associated hallmarks of rationality. 
Critics were quick to highlight the implausibility of this decision making paradigm, and 
empirical studies soon emerged which called into question its basic underlying 
assumptions (Cyert and March, 1963; Simon, 1979). For example, preferences were 
found to be inconsistent across time and people; individuals were seen to be satisficers, 
not maximisers; and search behaviour was revealed to be often local rather than 
exhaustive. Yet critics were slow in developing an alternative model of decision making, 
and rational choice theory continued to dominate the organisational literature, albeit in 
somewhat different forms (Simon, 1979; Jaeger, Renn, Rosa and Weber, 2001). Yet by 
the late 1980s the premise that organisations could be plausibly modelled as rational 
entities became increasingly untenable.  This was largely in response to a series of high 
profile, costly, and often tragic organisational failures, most notably Chernobyl, 
Challenger, and Bhopal. The idea was not that disasters indicated or were the sole 
province of “irrational” organisations. Rather, these events seemed to cast doubt on the 
conventional ways that academics conceived of and studied all organizational behavior.   
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And so organisational judgement and choice was re-conceived of as an entirely 
messier and more problematic affair than rational choice theory suggested. Scholars 
began to focus on the “dark side of organizations” (Vaughan, 1999), on the ways that 
judgment and choice departed from classical assumptions of rationality, and on the 
central importance of norms, rituals, and social structures in shaping organizational 
behavior. A key idea cutting across much of this emerging literature is that organisations 
should be viewed as socio-technical systems, in the sense that the way they work – or fail 
to work – is shaped by a mixture of technical, physical, governance, organisational and 
behavioural factors (Perrow, 1984; Turner, 1978; Woo and Vicente, 2003). Another core 
claim is that there are certain intrinsic features of system design and organisation that 
shape the potential for crises (e.g. interactive complexity and tight coupling; Perrow, 
1984), although there are differing views over the extent to which organisational cultures 
and management systems can mitigate these features (Pidgeon, 2011). A final key 
concept is that accidents and crises rarely simply happen, but are often preceded by a 
series of small-scale organisational and technical failings during an “incubation period” 
that can last for several years (Turner, 1978). This highlights the importance of analysing 
organisational responses to crises or risk issues as processes that unfold over time 
(MacGillivray et al., 2011).  
 
But the shift away from rational choice theory has not been quite as coherent as 
the above overview implies. Instead, the turn can be grouped – with the license of 
simplification – into two broad research paradigms or schools of thought. One focuses on 
the role of power and politics; the other is mainly concerned with bounded rationality. 
The former is predominantly composed of sociologists and political scientists, with 
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(behavioural) economists and psychologists in the latter. Of course, there has been cross-
fertilisation of ideas and collaborations across these boundaries, (e.g. behavioural 
economists increasingly draw on sociological concepts), and moreover we shouldn’t 
downplay the diversity found within these schools (e.g. Edmondson and McManus, 
2007). Yet they remain in a sense competing paradigms, with their own contrasting sets 
of disciplinary assumptions, methodological perspectives, and organising concepts (e.g. 
choice vs. routines). The basic assumption of the power and politics model is that 
organisations do not possess a single, superordinate goal (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 
1992). Instead, they are coalitions of individuals who may share some goals, but who also 
have conflicting interests and preferences (e.g. safety vs. productivity, competition 
between departments for funds, etc.). These conflicts tend to be resolved in ways that 
reflect the desires of the most powerful organisational actors (ibid.). Moreover, decision 
makers often attempt to change power structures by engaging in political behaviours, for 
example coalition formation, strategic uses of information, and so forth. By contrast, the 
bounded rationality school is psychological in origin, and largely neglects the social, 
political and cultural aspects of business decision making. The animating idea is that a 
range of cognitive heuristics (e.g. availability, representativeness, anchoring and 
adjustment) and biases influence how organisations select, frame, and evaluate decision 
problems, often in ways that sharply contrast with the norms of utility maximisation (e.g. 
Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Starbuck, 2009; Bazerman, 1998; Woods and Cook, 1999). 
Although this turn away from rational choice theory has led to significant improvements 
in our understanding of how decisions are made in organisational settings, it is not 
without its limitations.  
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Critically, research within the bounded rationality tradition traces its intellectual 
origins to Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) heuristics and biases programme, rather than 
to Herbert Simon’s earlier work. As a consequence, research on rules of thumb in 
organisational decision making – whether theoretical or empirical – tends to conceive of 
heuristics as error-prone rather than adaptive, as broadly specified rather than well 
defined, and as intuitively rather than consciously applied. This leads to various 
methodological and conceptual problems: 
 
 Research in this tradition tends to begin with the identification of some pathology 
of judgment or choice (e.g. a bias, or a bad decision), which is then mapped post-
hoc onto one or another cognitive heuristic (e.g. Bazerman, 1998; Marnet, 2007). 
The process analysis tends to be relatively shallow or even non-existent. This 
stems from the view that heuristics are intuitive tools whose application is neither 
explicit nor accessible to the conscious mind (e.g. Krabuanrat and Phelps, 1998). 
The problem with this approach is that Tversky and Kahneman’s heuristics are so 
broadly specified that they can be called upon, post facto, to account for almost 
any flawed choice or behaviour (Gigerenzer, 1991, 1996). 
 The empirical research is mostly conducted in the laboratory rather than the field 
(Elbanna, 2006), and so is not particularly well suited to examining the role that 
politics, conflicting interests, power-relations, and organisational structures play 
in shaping heuristic decision making in organisational settings (Heimer, 1988; 
Clarke, 1992). This lack of representative design also means that the work tends 
to trade in some rather bold extrapolations.      
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 Researchers have largely neglected the question of when or in what 
organisational contexts the use of heuristics might be adaptive (i.e. ecological 
rationality), focussing instead on the biases that purportedly stem from their 
application. Yet the fact that some of the standard cognitive biases are in conflict 
with each other or outright contradictory (Krueger and Funder, 2004; Gigerenzer, 
1991) casts doubt on the claim that they reflect universal or hard-wired failings in 
cognition (MacGillivray and Pidgeon, 2011). This suggests that a keener 
appreciation of context and its relationship to rationality is required.  
 
However, there is an alternative concept of heuristics – to date largely neglected 
in the organisational studies and management literatures – that sidesteps some of these 
limitations. In brief, the fast and frugal research programme emphasises the importance 
of delineating well specified models of inference and choice, and on paying close 
attention to the external environments in which heuristics function (Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Research Group, 1999). Importantly, 
this programme acknowledges its heavy intellectual debt to Herbert Simon, who was a 
sceptic of dual process theories of cognition (Simon, 1997, p 129, 137)
 
and who preferred 
to believe that decision makers were broadly aware of – and could articulate – the 
processes by which they formed judgments and reached choices. Another key principle of 
this program is that heuristics are not necessarily inferior to what are classically 
understood as “optimal” methods of reasoning. For example, the recent financial crisis 
has highlighted the dangers of relying on sophisticated mechanistic models for governing 
complicated systems (Haldane and Madouros, 2012). The basic insight is that in many 
cases, models purporting to describe the states and mechanisms of complex systems may 
7 
 
be unobtainable (Scheffer et al., 2012) or perhaps dangerously misleading. In these 
contexts, the logic of prediction and control, and its central assumption of full or nearly 
complete mechanistic understanding of the relevant system, can feed rather than prevent 
crises (Wynne, 1992; Haldane and Madouros, 2012; Haldane and May, 2011). An 
alternative logic is to design and manage systems – whether water supply, climate, or 
financial systems – on the basis of simple rules, or heuristics, that capture the essential 
elements of system operation without aspiring to full description. Simulation work in line 
with this principle has generated novel and important insights in various settings. For 
example, it has shown that heuristic models of risk in financial markets can outperform 
the more complex techniques favoured by regulators (Haldane and Madouros, 2012), and 
that there may be generic rules of thumb that presage collapse or crisis in systems ranging 
from physiological ones to ecological ones (e.g. a reduced rate of recovery from 
perturbations; Scheffer et al., 2012). What the above sketch is intended to convey is that 
deliberative heuristics may have a central role to play in how we analyse, design, and 
manage all sorts of systems; that this role may not necessarily be a dangerous one; and 
that, above all, we should take this role seriously. This article makes an attempt to do so, 
drawing on the principles of the fast and frugal program, albeit from a rather different 
methodological perspective.   
 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
Rationale 
The aim of the research was to explore the role of heuristics in real-world 
organisational decision making. The research questions were: what heuristics are 
employed; what factors shape their ecological rationality; and how is their form and 
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function influenced by social and political factors? A retrospective field study was 
adopted, looking specifically at decision making during water contamination events (i.e. 
crisis situations).  The logic behind this was two-fold. Firstly, crisis decision making is 
characterised by time constraints, limited and often ambiguous information, intense 
pressure, and often stark conflicts of interest. As such, heuristics are likely to be 
employed, and their use is also particularly likely to be shaped by social and political 
factors (e.g. power structures). Secondly, recent years have brought a series of high-
profile public inquiries into the handling of contamination events in North America and 
Australia, focussed in large part on understanding the contexts, rationales, and 
implications of key decisions taken by regulators, managers, and operating staff. The data 
produced allows us to reconstruct – subject to limitations – the processes by which 
judgments and choices were reached in real-world situations. Of course, such inquiries 
tend to focus on decisions that have gone wrong in some sense, and so, by extension, 
does this study. But the intention is not to suggest that heuristics generally misfire – the 
choice is largely a pragmatic one. That is, the study sought to analyse heuristics via 
(retrospective) process analysis, and the data required for this approach is generally only 
available for decisions that have misfired. Yet it is also by design – by studying instances 
where heuristics have gone awry, we can gain insights into their ecological rationality. 
 
Methods 
The study is a retrospective analysis of decision making preceding and during 
water contamination events. The sample consists primarily of relatively recent, well-
publicised, major incidents which occurred in the developed world (Walkerton, North 
Battleford, and Sydney). The data is composed of the accounts of actors involved in 
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decision making processes within the events (e.g. operators, management, regulators), 
supported by the accounts of those who observed or studied them (e.g. public inquiry 
heads, scholars) for context and to aid the theoretical analysis. The principal data sources 
are the reports, transcripts and submissions to public inquiries into those events (outlined 
in Table 1). The data analysis was undertaken in the spirit of the grounded theory 
approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The initial stage was identifying the decision 
making processes which the inquiries focussed upon. These included, for example, 
judgments about the plausibility of concerns raised by operating staff, and decisions 
about how to respond to reports of microbiological contamination. These inferences and 
decisions were then analysed with the goal of discovering which, if any, heuristic 
underlay them. This involved scrutinising the evidence within the inquiry reports and 
academic case studies, tracing this back to witness testimony (in the transcripts) and 
evidence submissions, cross-checking these different sources and types of evidence along 
the way.  Following in the spirit of protocol analysis, the focus of the analysis was on the 
processes or rationales by which inferences were made, and choices reached, rather than 
on the judgments or decisions themselves. The heuristics were then grouped into 
categories according to their similarities and differences. This process was performed 
iteratively, so that what began as series of disparate heuristics were subsumed into three 
well-specified, general purpose rules of inference and choice (e.g. an initial heuristic was 
“if a disease outbreak occurs, then presume the source is viral;” this was later subsumed 
within the larger category of the precedent heuristic). Heuristics are defined here as rules 
of thumb for inference and choice. There are three key elements to this definition: 
heuristics are rule-like, in the sense that they structure or constrain judgment; they are 
rules of inference or choice (i.e. if-then), not simply assumptions; and finally, they are 
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simple, frugal approaches to problem solving which ignore relevant information rather 
than seeking to optimize. Although heuristics are treated rather differently across and 
even within different disciplines – in terms of their normative status, where they reside, 
and whether they are implicit or explicit – this definition seems to capture some key 
shared understandings (see also, Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011).  
 
There are important limits to this methodological approach. Public inquiries are 
broadly concerned with seeking the truth of the events that they study – what happened, 
why, and with what implications – but the intentions or abilities of the witnesses called 
may be quite different. Major issues include blame management and imperfect recall. But 
inquiries are not blind to such problems, indeed their very design is rooted in the concept 
of triangulation. Multiple witnesses are called upon, various sources of evidence are 
sought (oral testimony, formal submissions, etc.), claims are scrutinised and cross-
checked for internal and external consistencies, etc. In short, triangulation is built into the 
object and design of our study, and so whilst we are indeed analysing the claims of 
particular actors with particular interests, these claims have been cross-checked for 
consistency and coherence against multiple sources and types of evidence. For example, 
when an actor claims that he took a particular decision for a particular reason, we can 
cross-check this claim against the rest of their testimony, compare it with other witnesses’ 
versions of events, and scrutinise whether other sources of evidence made available to the 
inquiry – such as internal memos or water quality monitoring records – are at odds with 
his claims. Of course this is the real world and not the laboratory, and so we are dealing 
with actors, data sources, and events that we cannot control in a strict methodological 
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sense. But these are the unavoidable costs of venturing out to study decision making in 
the wild. As such, the work should be taken as exploratory rather than confirmatory. 
 
In the remainder of the paper, we present this classification of heuristics, discuss 
their ecological rationality, and explore their relationship to social and political factors. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
For context, Table 1 provides the basic features of the water contamination events 
analyzed. Table 2 characterizes the heuristics employed in managing these events. We 
presume no detailed knowledge on the part of the reader regarding the infrastructure and 
processes of water supply systems. That said, to best illuminate the form and structure of 
each heuristic, some technical and operational details are touched upon. In the remainder 
of this section, we discuss the three heuristics in turn, beginning with the credibility 
heuristic, the precedent heuristic, and, finally, the facts-trump-speculation heuristic. 
 
Table 1 and Table 2 here. 
 
The credibility heuristic: a rule for discriminating between signal and noise 
Perhaps the simplest rule of thumb observed was the credibility heuristic. It can 
be classed as a conjunctive rule, whose purpose is to distinguish between frivolous and 
genuine warning messages. This is a classical task for both lay and expert reasoning. 
Whilst the latter tend to rely on statistical methodologies to do so (e.g. significance 
testing), these more formal methods are generally far removed from the context of crisis 
management. Our rule acts to discriminate between a signal from a target and noise from 
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a distracter, using the perceived credibility of the message conveyer as the sole cue 
(Table 2).  In this context, warning messages are data which suggest concern with the 
safety of the drinking water supply system, and can be thought of as risk-indicators. 
These messages may come from people (e.g. concerns raised about an unsafe operating 
practice) or from technical systems (e.g. alarms indicating a failure of disinfection 
systems). On first glance, this heuristic seems close to tautological (“we believe those 
whom we find credible”), but it is not. It is a rule of thumb that involves the neglect of 
potentially relevant information (e.g. substantive issues about the signal content, and the 
costs and benefits of neglecting or acting upon it), and uses one cue (the perceived 
credibility of the signal’s conveyor) to structure decision-making.  
 
Now for some examples of the rule’s application. To begin with, prior to the 
outbreak of waterborne disease in North Battleford (Hrudey et al., 2006), plant operator 
Peter Allen raised a series of general concerns and warnings about the hazard posed by 
cryptosporidium (the pathogen ultimately responsible for the outbreak) to both senior 
management and the utility administration (Laing, 2002, p 97). Yet rather than investigate 
the substantive validity of these concerns (e.g. by exploring the pathogen’s existence in 
source water, the effectiveness and reliability of the treatment and disinfection processes 
in removing it, etc.), management and the administration dismissed his warnings as non 
credible, largely because Allen only raised them in the context of negotiations about 
improvements in occupational health and safety or more general labour matters (Laing, 
2002, p 98). As Allen stated in his inquiry testimony, “it was decided that I was the wing 
nut in the operation and that I didn't know what I was talking about” (North Battleford 
inquiry transcript, 12
th
 October, 2001, p36-37). In large part, Allen was perceived as 
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using these warnings as bargaining chips in pursuit of a broader political agenda. Put 
simply, a judgment about Allen’s credibility precluded an evaluation of the merits of his 
concerns. 
 
 Of course, given the high level of automation of many modern water supply 
systems, the conveyor of warning messages is often a machine of sorts. But credibility 
remains an issue here. This study uncovered cases where spurious warning messages 
from machines (e.g. alarms indicating a failure of disinfection processes) were perceived 
as being endemic, such that warning messages were met with the uncritical presumption 
that they were false positives (i.e. that they did not reflect a genuine problem), with 
limited or no further investigation by staff. This happened at minor incidents in Scotland 
at Oykel Bridge (DWQR, 2008, p75) and the Western Isles (DWQR, 2008, p118), where 
low chlorine alarms were ignored by system operators on the mistaken assumption that 
they were faulty readings, of which there had been several in the preceding periods. On 
first glance, this merely illustrates the fairly banal point that automated systems can lose 
their credibility, particularly during periods where they consistently raise false alarms. On 
closer inspection, this is crucial for water supply systems, where the relatively low 
frequency of microbial and chemical contamination events, combined with the typical 
specificity and sensitivity of detection systems, creates a tendency for false positives to 
dominate false negatives during routine operations (Hrudey and Leiss, 2006). This means 
that clusters of spurious warning messages will not be uncommon, even when alarm 
systems are functioning properly. During such periods, staff may mistakenly conclude 
that alarm systems are malfunctioning, leading to the neglect of genuine warning 
messages. In the words of the old fable, “even when liars tell the truth, they are never 
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believed.” This suggests that certain structural features of water supply systems can limit 
the correlation of credibility with the criterion that it is purporting to predict – in this 
case, whether the message represents signal or noise. This tells us something about the 
factors that shape the ecological rationality of the rule. Another issue is how and where 
exactly the threshold is drawn for judging credibility, whether it is learned or taught 
socially, and whether it should embody precautionary norms in particular environments.  
But at root the question of when it makes sense to rely on the credibility heuristic, and 
when to prefer other rules or even alternative species of reasoning (e.g. factors based 
judgments, see Box 1), is a comparative one, and one that requires the specification and 
testing of alternative models of choice in controlled experimental settings (Gigerenzer 
and Gaissmaier, 2011). More on some of these ideas later. 
 
Box 1 here. 
 
The precedent heuristic: a rule for reasoning by analogy  
The second rule of thumb observed was the precedent heuristic. It works by 
categorising individual events as part of a (typically larger) class of historic events. In the 
context of crisis management it functions as follows: search for precedent(s) for 
unfolding event (i.e. historic analogue(s)), and if identified, then treat the current event in 
the same fashion as they were. It is a form of reasoning by analogy, the underlying 
principle being treat like cases alike. The analogues may range from single, near-replicas 
of the particular event or phenomenon being considered, to a larger set of approximate 
comparators. We start with an example of the former. Immediately prior to the North 
Battleford outbreak, one of the operators voiced concerns about the problems posed by 
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operating the plant with zero settling in the solids contact unit (SCU) (Laing, 2002, p 101, 
144). Briefly, the SCU was relied upon to clarify the water (via chemical coagulation, 
flocculation and sedimentation) before the rapid sand filtration process, and its 
suboptimal performance was later identified as the proximal cause of the 
Cryptosporidium outbreak. A key reason for marginalising these concerns was the 
precedent of the “trouble free” period the previous year, when the plant had operated 
under those very same circumstances without incident (i.e. where the SCU was operating 
without a key piece of equipment, and not achieving adequate settling, yet no harm to the 
population resulted) (Saskatchewan Environmental Society and Nature Saskatchewan, 
2002, p5). This case doesn’t tell us a great deal about the ecological rationality of the 
heuristic – beyond highlighting the problems of relying on a single precedent, and by 
extension, the dangers of over-generalising. That is, the heuristic wasn’t misapplied in the 
sense of the two cases being fundamentally different in some way (i.e. the analogical 
mapping was not spurious), instead, the issue was more one of sample size. That is to say, 
the water system had indeed been at significant risk during the earlier “trouble free” 
period of operation, and it was only due to system redundancies, safety margins, and pure 
chance that harm had not resulted during this period. And so the precedent it had set was 
misleading. In industries characterised by a propensity for rapid change (e.g. in 
technologies, working practices, external environments), or where cause-effect 
relationships are complex and stochastic (e.g. where sub-optimal process operation does 
not always lead to adverse consequences in output), reliance on small sample sets in 
analogical reasoning may be particularly problematic. Put another way, a larger training 
set seems required, so that the heuristic’s application captures a broader picture of the 
underlying system variability. And so we’d plausibly expect to see the precedent heuristic 
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drawing on larger sets of analogues in these sorts of environments, two examples of 
which we discuss below. 
 
Both examples involve public health officials seeking to find the source of disease 
outbreaks within their communities, which is central to limiting their spread and for 
guiding options for treating the ill. We begin with Walkerton, where health officials were 
informed (on May 19
th 
2000) of symptoms within the population that were consistent 
with infection by a particular strain of E. Coli (O'Connor, 2002, p 9). At this stage, the 
officials were unaware of problems with the water supply system. Their initial response 
was to adopt the default presumption that the outbreak was likely food-borne, and this 
served to guide their early investigations into the source of the outbreak (O'Connor, 2002, 
p 69, 70, 75). Their training and experience told them that that food is by far the most 
prevalent source of outbreaks with symptoms of that nature (in developed nations). More 
specifically, given the limited case-specific details which they had at the outset, the 
officials reasoned that the most sensible presumption was to defer to precedent, or base 
rates (ibid.). We saw the same logic at work in North Battleford. Here, on learning of 
evidence of an outbreak of enteric disease (April 12
th
-13
th
, 2001), the town’s chief 
medical officer presumed that viral pathogens – either transmitted by food or person-to-
person – were the likely source (given the base rates), and structured his investigations 
accordingly (Laing, 2002, p 135, 138, 186). In both cases, the initial presumptions turned 
out to be wrong. The point is not that deferring to base rates is unwise; to the contrary, it 
is an entirely reasonable strategy when there is limited or ambiguous case-specific 
evidence.  
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An important question, however, is whether those default presumptions are 
flexible starting points, open to adjustment as case-specific evidence begins to 
accumulate. Walkerton is an excellent example of this: as evidence emerged suggesting 
that water rather than food was the source of the outbreak (e.g. the very young and the 
elderly had contracted bloody diarrhoea), the public health officials issued a 
precautionary boil water advisory on May 21
st
 2000, a full two days before tests 
confirmed that the drinking water supply was contaminated (O'Connor, 2002, p 80-81). 
North Battleford provides us with a contrasting example. Here, the town’s medical health 
officer remained of the view that the outbreak was most likely viral in origin up until 
April the 23
rd
 2001, and by extension transmitted by food or person-to-person, making 
only cursory inquiries into one of the town’s two water supply systems as potential 
sources (Laing, 2002, p 137). This was despite a growing volume of confirmed 
cryptosporidium infections in the population (a protozoan rather than viral pathogen), and 
no obvious common factor to suggest food-borne or person-to-person transmission as a 
source. This fixation or anchoring on the base-rates markedly exacerbated the scope of 
the waterborne outbreak. 
 
These two contrasting cases should not be taken as illustrating the differences 
between rule-based and probabilistic styles of reasoning, with the Walkerton officials 
being the archetypical Bayesians in contrast to North Battleford’s heuristic thinkers. 
Instead, it shows us the different ways in which the same rule of thumb can be applied in 
broadly similar situations, highlighting the central importance of flexibility. Rules, 
particularly those applied deliberatively and explicitly, are never quite rules, both in the 
sense that there is inescapable semantic and substantive ambiguity in how they are 
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interpreted (Wittgenstein, 1958), but also in the way that their conscious nature means 
that they are always, at least in principle, open to critical scrutiny and over-riding. The 
key lesson of the two cases seems to be that heuristics are not problematic per se, but can 
become so when we treat them as laws and neglect their rough and contingent nature. We 
return to this idea later, when we discuss the concept of safeguards or hedges in rule-
based reasoning. 
 
The facts-trump-speculation heuristic: a non-compensatory approach to weighting 
evidence 
The third rule of thumb observed was the facts-trump-speculation heuristic. Its 
function is to discriminate between competing explanations or claims based on pre-
determined (but possibly implicit) hierarchies of evidence (orders of cue validity). It has 
some structural commonalities with the credibility heuristic, a key distinction being that 
the former focuses on the interpretation of a discrete signal, whilst the latter is concerned 
with multiple lines of evidence. It is a non-compensatory approach to weighting evidence, 
functioning as follows:  when faced with conflicting explanations or claims about a 
phenomenon, order them according to a predefined hierarchy of evidence (cue validities), 
and treat the highest ranked line of evidence as true. The explanations or claims with 
which we are concerned may relate, for example, to weaknesses in the water supply 
system, to the causes of unfolding events, or to the most effective solutions to problems. 
Often these types of claims or explanations come into conflict, and this heuristic offers a 
simple way of discriminating between them.  The rule’s underlying principle is simple 
enough: explanations or claims with the strongest factual or evidentiary basis are to be 
preferred to those resting on mere plausible hypotheses, speculations, or more broadly 
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lacking a powerful evidentiary basis. On first glance, it may appear more of a rule of 
logic than a rule of thumb – or what philosophers call a universal generalisation (e.g. “all 
bachelors are unmarried;” Schauer, 2003). In other words, are facts not better than 
speculations as a matter of definition? Not so. The key points are that the rule involves 
the neglect of utilities; does not attempt to aggregate competing lines of evidence (instead 
treating the strongest line as true); and is based on hierarchies of evidence (cue validities) 
which are inevitably contingent, socially constructed and context dependent (e.g. in some 
decision-making tasks, the available speculations may do more interpretive work for us 
than what are classified as stronger forms of evidence). 
 
To flesh out these concepts, we first need to briefly outline two classes of 
evidence that have special significance for crisis management in the water supply sector: 
measures of microbial safety and of process reliability. Although there is some overlap 
between the two, the former describe the microbiological quality of the water itself (e.g. 
colony counts, E. coli), whereas the latter describe the reliability or performance of 
particular steps or processes in the water supply system (e.g. chlorine residuals, turbidity 
levels, pH). The measures of microbial safety – particularly those indicating faecal 
contamination – have traditionally been viewed as the strongest evidence of the safety of 
the water supply system (or unsafety), although recent years have seen a growing 
emphasis on measures of process reliability (e.g. Ashbolt et al., 2001). We now move to 
some instances of the heuristic’s application. 
 
 Recall that at North Battleford, some months prior to the outbreak itself, there was 
a “trouble free” period during which the plant operated without adequate mixing in the 
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solids contact unit. The role of this unit is to clarify the water. It essentially works by 
letting suspended material settle by gravity, which in turn is crucial for the removal of 
pathogens. During this period, two operating staff raised concerns about the hazards 
posed by operating in these conditions (Laing, 2002, p 87). The plant supervisor brushed 
off those concerns about system safety by noting that, at the time, the turbidity and 
chlorine residual measures were within normal parameters (measures of process 
reliability) (ibid.). As the subsequent inquiry revealed, he failed to seriously consider 
what the function of the solids contact unit was, or the potential implications of operating 
without achieving adequate mixing in it. Thus, the evidence of process reliability (the 
“facts”), as reflected in the reassuring turbidity and chlorine residual measures, served to 
trump the concerns raised by the operators. Although no outbreak occurred during this 
phase, the water supply system was at considerable risk. This points to one limit of the 
facts-trump-speculation heuristic, namely that even strong forms of evidence often bear 
only a stochastic relationship to the reality that they purport to represent. Put more 
blandly, the measures of process reliability are proxies for risk, rather than infallible 
indicators. Take turbidity levels first. This measure is useful because pathogens are more 
likely to be present in highly turbid source waters, and, moreover, high turbidity levels 
render any pathogens that are present more resistant to disinfection. However, it is also 
true that high levels of pathogens, such as cryptosporidium, can be found in source waters 
within normal bounds of turbidity. By the same token, the presence of chlorine residuals 
post-disinfection is a reliable indicator that most disease causing organisms have been 
removed. Yet this measure is largely irrelevant with regard to pathogens that are resistant 
to chlorination, such as cryptosporidium. This problem is by no means unique to the 
incident that we described; we observed several instances wherein tentative or speculative 
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concerns about system safety were (wrongly, as it turned out) dismissed with reference to 
the more concrete evidence reflected in monitoring results. The point, by now perhaps 
laboured, is that this non-compensatory rule – where the strongest line of evidence is 
treated as true – draws on generalisations (cue orderings) and so will inevitably misfire in 
certain contexts. The question then becomes: in which particular contexts will the rule 
misfire, and how might its performance compare with alternative species of reasoning?  
 
 Drawing on Todd et al. (2011), we can tentatively suggest that its ecological 
rationality will be limited in situations where a) the hierarchies of evidence upon which it 
is based are uncertain, or b) where there is low or moderate variability in cue weights (i.e. 
the cue validities are not highly-skewed), or c) where the hierarchies are context 
dependent (i.e. the cue validity orderings are unstable). These characteristics seem 
roughly true of water supply systems, where even the strongest forms of evidence of 
system safety bear an imperfect relationship to the states of the world that they seek to 
represent, and where ideal cue-orderings shift depending on a range of contextual 
characteristics. Although of course this is a rough intuition, rather than a formal 
treatment. A second issue is that we are dealing with public health issues – where the 
costs of action and inaction are asymmetric – and so neglecting utilities seems 
particularly problematic (Hrudey and Leiss, 2003). Perhaps a modified form of the rule 
might be more ecologically rational in this context. In one such modified form, the 
decision-maker would treat the strongest line of evidence as true, whilst allocating 
resources to investigate the line of evidence suggesting the worst-case scenario. This can 
be thought of as a sort of maximin safeguard, or precautionary hedge. The question of 
safeguards – in terms of which ones exist, when they are applied, and with what costs and 
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benefits – has been largely neglected in the heuristics literature. This is probably because 
heuristics have been predominantly conceived of as residing at the subconscious level. 
But if we take seriously the idea that people are often aware that they are relying on rule-
based reasoning (e.g. Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 2011), it seems more than plausible to 
think that they might be using them alongside certain safeguards or corrective hedges. 
Indeed, the ancient legal concept of equity – a safeguard against the injustices that can 
stem from the mechanical application of rules – and Plato and Aristotle’s arguments in 
favour of it, reflect this very idea (Schauer, 2003). 
 
Another interesting aspect of the heuristic is that what passes for fact and what 
counts as speculation – in other words, the hierarchies of evidence or cue-orderings on 
which the rule draws – is in part socially constructed. This does not simply mean that 
those hierarchies are contingent – which we discussed above – it calls our attention to the 
roles of politics, power, and interests, in shaping how the heuristic is applied. Doing so 
also leads us to consider whether the rule might be applied in a justificatory or strategic 
way. In other words, that the rule might be (implicitly) called upon to rationalize 
decisions taken on other grounds, or to persuade other social actors. A case in point is the 
Sydney contamination event. By way of background, between the 21
st
 and 28
th
 of July 
1998, routine and follow-up sampling had detected low-to-high levels of protozoan 
contamination at various points within Sydney’s water supply system (McClellan, 1998, 
p 29-39). Making sense of these results was a complex affair, as the pattern of 
contamination was changing from day-to-day, both in terms of the levels detected and the 
areas implicated (Stein, 2000). Nevertheless, the initial view – held by the water company 
and the public health agency – was that the contamination was likely localized, perhaps 
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arising from pockets of negative pressure which were allowing untreated water into the 
system (McClellan 1998, p 35). Reflecting this, a boil water notice was issued for a small 
part of the system on the 27
th
of July. On the 29
th
 of that month, the situation changed 
radically. Contamination was detected in sediment at the bottom of one of the clear water 
tanks at a major plant (Prospect plant, which served the majority of Sydney), and in its 
downstream reservoir (Potts Hill) (McClellan, 1998, p 40-41).   On account of this, 
discussions in Sydney Water’s Operations Room that evening were converging upon the 
view that: a) the source of the contamination was further upstream than previously 
thought; b) that the contaminants had likely dispersed throughout a far broader area of the 
system (the Prospect Plant served the majority of Sydney), and c) that a far broader boil 
water advisory was required.  
 
This convergence was challenged when Sydney Water’s chairman arrived at the 
Operations Room, voicing his skepticism that the scope of the alert should be extended to 
cover the entire Prospect system. At the onset of the ensuring debate, one of the senior 
operations staff (Mackender) drew attention to the contamination detected in one of the 
clear water tanks at Prospect (McClellan, 1998, p 50). Yet the chairman (Hill) 
marginalized these data-sets (that particular tank was offline at the time), and focused 
instead on the recent clear readings immediately downstream of the plant. Mackender 
countered by noting the utility’s recent experience of obtaining clear readings from areas 
later found to be contaminated (ibid.). On this basis, he was unwilling to dismiss Prospect 
as the source of the contamination. The chairman responded: 
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“I don’t want to know about your theory, I want to work on the actual data you’ve got 
[showing] where there is a problem.” (ibid.) 
 
Throughout the discussion, Hill repeatedly stated “tell me the facts,” and “where 
have you actually observed this parasite? Where have you actually observed it?” (ibid.) 
As Mackender noted, his “best technical assessment of what could happen” (McClellan, 
1998, p 51) was reduced to being, in Hill’s eyes, mere speculation. As Mackender 
recalled: 
 
“I think he listened to what I had to say [regarding Prospect being potential source of 
contamination] and took the bits that he wanted to hear and made a decision. Now, he 
may have put less weight – he may have put less weight on my “speculation” and more 
weight on the part where we had numbers…” (ibid.) 
 
In short, the monitoring results that were suggestive of localized contamination 
were framed by the chairman as concrete facts, as valid evidence, whilst the technical 
arguments which spoke to a far broader extent of contamination were dismissed as 
“speculation” or mere “theories,” and the data which seemed to support these claims was 
simply ignored. Ultimately, the views of the technical and operational staff – those 
individuals who best understood the system – were marginalized in favor of the 
Chairman’s view that they should limit the boil water notice to “the minimum area that 
could be demonstrated based on the facts.” (McClellan , 1998, p 57) Put another way, the 
Chairman’s construction of the facts trumped what he argued were the mere speculations 
and theories of his technical staff. The public inquiry concluded that the Chairman 
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seemed influenced by concerns for the water company’s reputation and commercial 
interests, rather than the protection of public health (McClellan, 1998, p 69). This serves 
to illustrate that questions of what facts should be treated as relevant, and of how to 
distinguish between facts and speculation (i.e. the ordering of cue validities), can be 
resolved in ways that favor hierarchies of power and particular organizational interests. 
On this reading, the Chairman seems to have called upon the heuristic to justify rather 
than make his decision – in appealing to an explicit if rather idiosyncratic hierarchy of 
evidence, and in forcefully arguing that the stronger line of evidence should be treated as 
true. In social settings, reason-giving is a central element to persuasion, and if those 
reasons can be formulated in a way that seems to accord with a useful (and perhaps 
widely used) heuristic, then all the better for the persuader. Heuristics can be seen then as 
tools that might be deployed strategically in social settings, and quite possibly in ways 
that are problematic. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Drawing on a retrospective field study of crisis management in the water supply 
sector, this paper has characterized three rules of thumb employed in real-world decision 
making: the credibility, precedent, and facts-trump speculation heuristics. Each heuristic 
has an underlying logic, can function in data sparse conditions, and allows for rapid 
decision making. As such, they lend themselves to crisis decision making. However, as 
they are inductive methods, they are of course no strangers to error. Taking its lead from 
the fast and frugal research program, this paper has focused not on cataloguing those 
biases, but rather on exploring the structural factors which shape each heuristic’s 
ecological rationality. In doing so, it has drawn upon and sought to extend the concept of 
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ecological rationality, introducing ideas about how particular infrastructure systems and 
forms of social organization structure the validity of cues, the accessibility of 
information, and the application of particular heuristics. This has been largely neglected 
in the heuristics literature to date – partly because of the lack of field studies, but also due 
to the conception of heuristics as intuitive tools, residing within the subconscious of 
individuals. Yet once we conceive of heuristics as applied consciously, deliberatively, 
and as subject to negotiation and social construction, we open up promising possibilities 
for exploring the relations between rule-based reasoning and social, political and 
organizational structures. It also opens up hitherto untraveled conceptual avenues, 
suggesting that we need to think about the safeguards that might be built into the 
application of rules, and also to explore the way that heuristics might be used to 
rationalize or justify inferences and choices, and perhaps as tools deployed to persuade 
other social actors. However, it also suggests limits on how narrowly we can define 
models of heuristics. That is, it implies that the precise form that rules take in particular 
instances will be shaped by power structures, contingencies, organizational histories, and 
personal experiences. Whilst this does not challenge their explanatory power, it does 
suggest limits on predictive capacity. Nevertheless, the fast and frugal program is a 
powerful framework for analyzing judgment and choice in organizations, and offers a 
bridge between psychological and political models of organizational behavior. 
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 Brief outline of events Key sources of data 
Walkerton, 
Ontario, 
Canada, 2000. 
Following heavy rainfall, an influx of manure from a nearby farm 
contaminated one of the wells at Walkerton, overwhelming the 
water supply system’s already inadequate disinfection barrier. A 
litany of failures impeded the discovery of and response to the 
contamination, including substandard operating practices (e.g. the 
failure to monitor chlorine residuals), inadequate regulatory 
oversight (e.g. the removal of a mechanism to ensure that the local 
medical officer of health and the provincial regulator were 
informed of adverse water quality results), and attempts at cover-
up on the part of the utility’s senior operator. Combined, these 
failures markedly increased the scope of the outbreak. In total, 
2,300 illnesses and 7 deaths were attributed to the pathogens 
Escherichia coli O157:H7 and Campylobacter jejuni. 
Public inquiry report (O'Connor, 2002). 
Inquiry transcripts, October 2000-October 
2001, available at 
http://mail.tscript.com/trans/walkerton2000.htm 
Selected submissions to the inquiry, e.g. from 
provincial government, the relevant union, etc. 
(not available at central source). 
Academic case studies, for context and insight 
rather than raw data (e.g. Hrudey et al., 2003; 
Woo and Vicente, 2003). 
North North Battleford’s surface water system was contaminated with Public inquiry report (Laing, 2002). 
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Battleford, 
Saskatchewan, 
Canada, 2001. 
Cryptosporidium (a protozoan pathogen), which most likely came 
from the upstream sewage treatment plant’s effluent. The pathogen 
breached the defenses of the water supply system and reached 
customer taps, largely owing to the sub-optimal operation of the 
solids contact unit (SCU). As symptoms of enteric disease emerged 
in the population, a failure on the part of the outbreak investigation 
team to rigorously consider water as a potential source, together 
with a significant time-lag before involving the environmental 
regulator, ultimately delayed the issuance of a boil water notice. In 
total, between 5,800 and 7,100 people were infected. 
Inquiry transcripts, September 2001-January 
2002, available at 
http://mail.tscript.com/trans/nb2000.htm 
Submissions to the inquiry, available at: 
http://www.justice.gov.sk.ca/nbwater/ 
Academic case studies, for context and insight 
rather than raw data (e.g. Hrudey et al., 2006; 
Hrudey and Hrudey, 2005; Woo and Vicente, 
2003). 
Sydney, 
Australia, 
1998. 
Moderate to extremely high levels of Cryptosporidium and Giardia 
cysts were detected in parts of Sydney’s water supply system, in 
both raw and treated water. The pattern of contamination changed 
from day-to-day, both in terms of the levels detected and the areas 
implicated. With hindsight, it is thought that heavy rainfall washed 
Public inquiry report (McClellan, 1998).  
The transcripts and submissions are stored at 
the state archives, but are liberally reproduced 
within the report itself. 
Academic case studies, for context and insight 
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animal fecal matter from polluted catchment areas into 
watercourses and dams, which the filtration system was unable to 
handle as it was experiencing operational difficulties. The water 
utility was severely criticized for its response to the early stages of 
the event, with the public inquiry head concluding that concerns for 
its commercial reputation appeared to override the interests of 
public health. However, no incidence of disease was observed, 
possibly because the cysts were not of an infective type. 
rather than raw data (Stein, 2000). 
Table 1: Basic features of the contamination events discussed in the paper, and key sources of data 
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 Rule form 
Credibility 
heuristic 
If the conveyor of the warning message passes a threshold of perceived credibility, then treat the message as 
being a signal from the target; if not, treat the message as being noise from a distracter. 
Precedent 
heuristic 
Search for precedent(s) for unfolding event (i.e. historic analogue(s)), and if identified, then treat current 
event in the same fashion as they were. 
Facts-trump-
speculation 
heuristic 
When faced with conflicting lines of evidence relating to a phenomenon, order them according to a 
predefined (but possibly implicit) hierarchy of evidence (cue validities), and treat the highest ranked line of 
evidence as true. 
Table 2: The heuristics observed 
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In the years running up to the Walkerton contamination event, the provincial government had put in place a series of deregulatory 
reforms and initiatives (O'Connor, 2002), which led to a reduction in regulatory inspections, technical assistance, and enforcement 
more broadly. These factors were later directly implicated in the waterborne disease outbreak (O'Connor, 2002). Yet it is far from 
the case that hazards of the deregulatory agenda only came to light after the event. Both before and during the implementation of 
the agenda, senior officials, ministers, and cabinet members within the provincial government received numerous specific and 
ultimately prophetic warnings that their reforms would threaten the safety of the drinking water supply (O’Connor, 2002, and 
specifically, the Walkerton inquiry transcripts, June 27
th
, 2001). These came from a range of sources, including the public union and 
from within the regulatory agency itself. The government responded to these concerns in a rather lackadaisical manner (see 
generally, O’Connor, 2002). Apparently, one reason for this relative disinterest was a judgment about the messengers’ credibility, 
but this doesn’t mean that the credibility heuristic was at work. 
 
To elaborate, in testimony at the public inquiry, the provincial Premier Mike Harris suggested that the objections raised by the 
union may have been something of a veil behind which their sectional interests lay (i.e. protecting the employment status of their 
members), and mused that the warnings raised from within the regulatory agency were perhaps part of a bargaining strategy, or a 
mask for bureaucratic self-interest (Walkerton inquiry transcripts, 29
th
 June, 2001). The implication was that the conveyors of the 
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warnings had vested interests in opposing the government’s deregulatory agenda (as their budgets, and the livelihoods of their 
members, were at stake). However, Harris stated that, although there was reason to question the credibility of the messengers, their 
claims were nevertheless investigated – given their potential public health implications and the need for due diligence – although by 
implication with less scrutiny than had the messengers passed muster. In other words, source credibility was a factor that informed 
his view of the claims, but one factor that was weighed alongside other aspects of the decision-problem, rather than a rule that 
structured the Government’s decision-making process. Of course, there are reasonable grounds to suspect that Harris’ recollection 
may be somewhat strategic, with his claims perhaps a convenient way of justifying the relative neglect of the warning signals 
(indeed, in the Government’s written submission to the inquiry, they remained of the view that deregulation had little or nothing to 
do with the tragedy). But this is orthogonal to our basic point, which is that Harris is describing a decision-process – factors based 
judgment – that is at times difficult to separate empirically from heuristic reasoning, yet which nonetheless has different structural 
features, justifications, strengths and limits (Sunstein, 1995; Schauer, 2003).  
Box 1: Distinguishing between rule-based reasoning and factors based judgments 
